Rule 60(b)(4) After Coney Island: Void Judgments and the Reasonable-Time Requirement

Accuracy update — reviewed August 7, 2026. This article has been revised to reflect Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026), which resolved a circuit split and held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement applies to Rule 60(b)(4) motions.

What Rule 60(b)(4) actually does

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) permits a federal court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding when “the judgment is void.” The category is narrow. In United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010), the Supreme Court explained that a judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous. Rule 60(b)(4) generally addresses certain jurisdictional defects and due-process violations so serious that the affected party was deprived of notice or the opportunity to be heard.

The timing rule changed nationally in 2026

Rule 60(c)(1) says that a motion under Rule 60(b) “must be made within a reasonable time.” Before 2026, several federal courts of appeals—including the First Circuit—had treated Rule 60(b)(4) motions as effectively exempt from that limit. That is no longer the controlling federal rule.

In Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, the Supreme Court held that the reasonable-time requirement applies to motions alleging voidness. The Court rejected a categorical right to wait indefinitely. It also recognized that reasonableness is context-specific: a defaulted defendant who did not learn of a judgment until enforcement began may have a materially different timing argument from a party who knew of the judgment for years and did nothing.

Improper service can still be a serious due-process defect

Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to inform an affected person of the proceeding and provide an opportunity to object. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988), the Court held that a default judgment obtained without constitutionally adequate notice could not be conditioned on proof that the defendant had a meritorious defense.

But a service defect does not produce the same result in every case. The governing service rule, the type of proceeding, actual notice, waiver, appearance, preservation of objections, state law, and the procedural vehicle used to seek relief can all matter. A party should distinguish an allegedly void judgment from one that is merely erroneous or voidable.

Fraud and “fraud on the court” are different doctrines

Ordinary fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party is addressed in federal court by Rule 60(b)(3), which carries a one-year outer limit under Rule 60(c)(1). “Fraud on the court” is a separate and exceptionally narrow doctrine preserved by Rule 60(d)(3). It is not a substitute for an untimely appeal or for every allegation that evidence was false, incomplete, or misleading.

Practical record questions

• What rule governed service in the original proceeding?
• What do the summons, return, affidavit, publication proof, docket, and orders actually show?
• When did the affected party first learn of the judgment or enforcement?
• Was personal-jurisdiction objection preserved, waived, or adjudicated?
• Is the challenge brought under federal Rule 60, a state analogue, an independent action, appeal, or another procedure?
• What does current controlling law in that court say about a “reasonable time”?

Primary sources

• Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
• Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026)
• United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)
• Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)

Build the record before choosing a remedy

For record-request and organization tools, see the clearly separate external Fathers Unchained Record Authority Starter Kit.

Educational information only. This article is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship.